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ABSTRACT: Social animals have to make collective decisions on a daily basis. In most instances, these 
decisions are taken by consensus, when the group does what the majority of individuals want. 
Individuals have to base these decisions on the information they perceive from their socioecological 
landscape. The perception mechanisms they use can influence the cost of collective decisions. Here I 
show that when group-living individuals perceive their environment concurrently for the same 
decisions, a quantum-like perception entanglement process can confer less costly collective 
decisions than when individuals collect their information independently. This highlights a mechanism 
that can help explain what may seem to be irrational group-living behavior and opens avenues to 
develop empirical tests for quantum decision theory. 
 
 
Social animals, including humans, make collective decisions for many facets of their daily 
lives (1, 2). Collective decisions have evolved in group-living species because they appear to be less 
costly than personal decisions when individuals try to maintain group membership. However, some 
observed features of collective decisions can seem irrational. For example, group decisions appear to 
be more accurate as group size increases, even when individuals are uninformed (2). A number of 
models have been developed to try and explain emergent collective behavior as well as infer the 
mechanisms through which collective decisions occur (2-4). In all cases, we assume that individuals 
collect information, in some form or other, to make a decision (1). However, the influence of 
perception systems on this process has received little attention to date.  
Before making a decision, individuals have to perceive the landscape in which they find 
themselves (5). In short, individuals have to generate knowledge from their socioecological 
landscape by first acquiring information from data (the landscape, Figure 1a) (6, 7). This mechanism 
involves two error processes: when the individual generates information from data and when the 
individual generates knowledge from the information it receives. Perception mechanisms are 
involved in generating information and therefore play a critical, yet unassessed, role in collective 
decisions. Importantly, one advantage of group living is shared perception. That is, the reliance of 
individuals on others to be vigilant (8) or find resources such as food (9). When individuals rely on 
others for perception, the knowledge generation process described above will co-vary between 
individuals within a group (Figure 1a). Eavesdropping, when one individual acquires information 
from the knowledge generation process of others, is a process that can drive this covariance (5, 9). 
Eavesdropping is thought to be prevalent in echolocating mammals (10-13). In such 
instances, silent individuals can receive the same information as echolocating conspecifics by 
listening to the echoes from the calls those produced. They can then use this information for a range 
of behavioral decisions (11, 12). However, this process is not exactly eavesdropping (Figure 1b). 
What we have instead is an entanglement in the information generation process between 
individuals present together in a group. This perception entanglement is an extreme case of 
perception covariance between group members which offers an interesting avenue to assess how 
perception mechanisms might affect collective decisions. 
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Figure 1. Two ways in which individuals can derive knowledge from their environment: in all cases 
one individual, i, generate information, I, with some error, εd, from data (its environment) and then 
generate knowledge, K, from I with some error, εI. Another individual can derive knowledge from the 
sampling of individual i. (a) It, j, can eavesdrop on i and generate information, Ij, either from Ii, or 
from observing individual i (gray arrow, for example, seeing i flee from an area). (b) When i uses an 
active perception system, such as echolocation (dotted line), to generate Ii, then j can also receive Ii 
directly but interpret it to generate Kj, with its own error process, εd,j. the perception of these two 
individuals is then entangled with consequences for the knowledge they generate. 
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We know that, for echolocating species, individuals in groups regularly listen to the echoes 
of others (14). Echolocation seems then irrational because echolocating individuals confer 
advantages to their closest competitors. They provide information about their environment to 
others who can then use it to their advantage and to the detriment of the echolocation producer. 
Some inclusive fitness processes (15) or simple cooperative mechanisms (16) could explain why this 
perception mechanism evolved. However, echolocation, and eavesdropping on echoes, is present in 
populations where grouping is not influenced by genetic relationships (10), interaction rates are too 
low for cooperation to be advantageous (13), or even in mix-species groups (10). 
Here I develop three contrasting mechanistic models of perception influences on collective 
decisions. I aim to resolve the “group-echolocation” conundrum, as an extreme case of perception 
co-variance, by testing whether mechanisms leading to such perception entanglement could yield 
beneficial collective decisions. One type of decisions groups have to regularly take collectively is the 
timing of their activities. Conradt and Roper (3) presented a simple and elegant model of timing 
decisions to show that consensus-building should be, in most cases, the most beneficial way to make 
such collective decisions. Here I extend their model to account for the effect of perception during 
individual’s knowledge acquisition to make decisions about activity timing. First, we assess whether 
benefits could emerge from perception interference; that is interference in knowledge generation 
between individuals that have many common experiences (17). Secondly, we assessed the costs of 
collective decisions when individuals make a rational, probabilistic, choice between generating 
knowledge from their own information or the information generated by others in their group (17). 
Lastly, we test whether a form of entanglement could result in beneficial collective decisions.  
Entanglement is a process that has been formally developed and explored in quantum 
mechanics to explain observed departures from expectations in classical mechanics (18, 19). 
Recently, formal and informal applications of quantum processes have been used to try and explain 
departure from rationality in game and decision theories. Informal applications simply borrow the 
mathematics and concepts behind known quantum effects (20, 21), as opposed to look for quantum 
effects in cognition (17), and that avenue is proving fruitful. I apply this approach here. I assume that 
individuals can be in two ‘perception’ states that are superposed: they can either use personal 
information (PI) or information generated by others (OI). Individuals do not choose a state in a 
rational manner (which reduces to a probabilistic approach, Figure 2a) but only select a quantum 
state in this Hilbert state space when they sample it (when they need to generate knowledge, Figure 
2a). As I described above, all individuals in the group have to go through this process based on 
entangled perception. This means that the state selection process is entangled between individuals.  
I simulated group decisions using these three perception mechanisms and contrasted them 
to the original model in which individuals always use PI (Figure 2a). As error and group size can 
influence the benefits of collective decisions (3), I simulated decisions over a range of error size (σ2, 
Eq.2) and group size (n, Eq. 1). Social structure can influence the evolution of cooperation and the 
genetic structure of populations. I therefore also assessed whether structuring in interactions could 
influence these benefits under the three perception models.  I sampled groups at random from 
social networks composed of units that interacted at varying rate. To do so, I simply derived random 
social networks with modularity ranging from 0.02, in which case these units are spurious, to 0.7 
(strong structuring) using the method described in (16). I present here results for a population of 100 
individuals with three social units. I run simulations for a range of population size and number of 
social units but this did not affect the results presented below. I simulated 100 decisions for each 
combination of error size, group size and network modularity. Groups were selected from the social 
network by first selecting at random a seed individual and then selecting the remaining group 
members using a random draw weighted by the association rate indices of the seed individual. The 
costs of collective decisions were derived from extension from the Conradt-Roper model: 
 
                                
 
          [1] 
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Which is the sum over all individuals, i, of the absolute difference in the real optimal timing of the 
activity, treal, for that individual and the perceived optimal timing of the activity, tperceived, for the 
median individual (
   
 
) where  
 
tperceived,i = treal,i +ε and ε~N(0,σ
2)         [2] 
 
I focus on this perception error. The cost computation does not change, only the way tperceived is 
inferred. For simplicity I randomly drew treal for each individual from a log-normal distribution with 
mean log(55min) and standard deviation 0.3. 
We first assume that perception interference from common experiences influence the actual 
error process. In that case, the error for an individual will be correlated with the error of others 
depending on its association rate indices with group members: 
 
                                           [3] 
 
where            is the Cholesky decomposition of the subset of AI for the n individuals in the 
group. 
In the case of a classical interaction of information, where individuals make a rational choice 
between OI and PI, the perceived timing is itself correlated between individuals: 
 
                                                [4] 
 
In both those models association rate indices are used as proxy of interference and interaction 
because close associates are also more likely to be physically closer to each other within a group 
(22)and individuals can be discriminated from their echoes in, at least, some species (23). 
The perceived timing of activity under entanglement can be inferred using an iterative-game 
like approach. We defined the entanglement as an iterative 2-player game-like interaction (Figure 
2b) played over all possible pairs in the group (18). The perception mode on which both individuals (i 
and j) decide after an interaction, fid ,  and fjd , , are defined as: 
 
0,
1
,
22
ijifi dd

  JUUJ         [5] 
 
0,
1
,
22
jijfj dd

  JUUJ         [6] 
 
Each player received a qubit at the beginning of the game and start with a propensity for PI. J is the 
entanglement operator defined by the entanglement assumed between the two players based on 
their association rate index, AIij:  
 
        
 
 
    
 
        
 
 
    
 
          [7] 
 
So that the entanglement rate is maximised when AIij =1.    is the bit-flip operator  
  
  
  (21). 
and U is the unitary matrix defined by the Hilbert space of quantum states (18). At this stage, the 
two qubits, one for each player, can be assigned to four possible combinations PIPI , , OIPI , ,
PIOI, , OIOI, . Here we simplified the unitary operator so that only the phase, θ, can vary 
between the two players (Figure 2a) so that for individual j: 
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and θj is drawn randomly and uniformly from [0;π] at every decision (18). The final timing decision of 
individual i is simply: 
 
                    
            
            
            
            
   fid ,  
 
       [9] 
 
 
 
Figure 2. (a) A graphical analogy of the three perception models tested in these simulations for two 
individuals, i and j, compared to the current collective decision model where individuals always use PI 
(‘independent’). Here PIj=OIi and PIi=OIj. Perception interference means that the error (error bars) around PI 
are correlated between i and j. When j eavesdrops on i, it integrates PIi and PIj to make a decision and chooses 
a state somewhere in between. When the perception of i and j are entangled, the choice is similar but can be 
approached from a number of angles depending on a phase, θ, which is a feature of the decision’s wave 
function (20). The choice is only known when it is sampled by the individual (when the individual needs to 
generate knowledge). (b) A circuit diagram representing this process. The entangled initial state results from 
entangling i and j with J while both had an initial state, 0,jd  for j, of using ‘PI’ (and its associated knowledge 
of tperceived). Entangled i and j then choose their state (‘PI’ or ‘OI’ using Ui and Uj respectively) and knowledge, 
tperceivedquant, is estimated from the decision that was taken after individuals become disentangled fjd , . 
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In all cases we estimated the costs to all individuals of classical consensus collective 
decisions (Eq. 1). I applied the three perception models to the same set of simulations so that I could 
compare their cost by simply taking the difference in costs resulting from each perception model 
(Eqs. 3,4,9) and the classical one (Eq. 2) for all iterations. I found that both perception interference 
(Figure 3a) and rational use of PI and OI (Figure 3b) do not lead to collective decisions that are less 
costly than decisions taken using PI only. However, we find that for a wide range of error size and 
group size conditions, decisions taken with perception entanglement are more beneficial than those 
using PI only (Figure 3c). We are therefore in the counter-intuitive situation that sharing the 
information acquisition process is less costly to individuals than acquiring their own information. 
Social network modularity did not influence the difference in costs (Figure 3d). Hence, the observed 
benefits of perception entanglement should exist across a wide range of social structure. This finding 
converges with the observations we previously described that echolocation occurs over a range of 
social landscapes and contexts. 
 
 
Figure 3. The estimated costs of simulated decisions show that (a) the cost of collective decisions under 
perception interference is always greater than if individuals perceive the environment independently (cost 
difference>0 for all simulated decisions). Outcomes are similar for perception interactions (b). However, 
decisions taken under perception entanglement (c) can be less costly than independent sampling (cost 
difference <0) for medium to large errors, σ
2
, depending on group size, n. Surfaces are the median difference 
in costs and the zero-cost plane is emphasized. The social network modularity did not influence the difference 
in costs when comparing perception entanglement and independent sampling (d, smoothed density of 
scatterplot using smoothScatter in R 2.14). 
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We now realize that rational choice models are limited in their abilities to predict decisions 
and actions (24-26). Quantum game theory (20) and quantum decision theory (QDT) (17) are 
emerging as alternative approaches to at least imitate observed irrational behaviors and choices. 
These are not based on quantum effects as we understand them in mechanics and 
electromagnetism, but they borrow the concept of the Schrödinger equation to describe the ‘fuzzy’ 
mechanisms that takes place when individuals take decisions. Considering decision making as 
quantum measurements has been proposed for a long time (24), however empirical tests have been 
lagging (18). Perception plays a key role in all facets of behavioral decisions and here it seems that a 
quantum-like model of perception can explain the seemingly irrational emergence of echolocation in 
groups. This active form of perception can emerge as a beneficial component of a collective, 
entangled, decision-making process when individuals exist in superposed states of information 
acquisition. Here we used a simple assumption to define the entanglement rate between individuals. 
Further work is required to develop formal representations of perception entanglement. For this our 
model bridges with recent developments of quantum cognition models (17). This concept can also 
be extended to account for other form of interactions during perception such as quantum 
interference and importantly points at a study system in which empirical tests of QDT can be 
developed. Interference and entanglement are emerging as important features of decision-making 
processes yielding what seem to be irrational behaviors under classical rational choice models (24). 
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